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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces the notion of ‘commonly knowing whether’, a non-standard version of stand-
ard common knowledge which is defined on the basis of ‘knowing whether’, instead of standard
‘knowing that’. After giving five possible definitions of this notion, we explore the logical relations
among them in the single-agent and multi-agent cases. We propose a sound and complete axiomat-
ization. We investigate one of the five definitions in terms of expressivity via a strategy of modal
comparison games.
1 Introduction
Common knowledge, or ‘commonly knowing that’, as the strongest concept among group epistemic notions, has
been studied extensively in various areas such as artificial intelligence, epistemic logic, epistemology, philosophy of
language, epistemic game theory, see e.g. [1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10]. Intuitively, a proposition is common knowledge among
a group of agents, if the proposition is true, everyone (in the group) knows it, everyone knows everyone knows it,
everyone knows everyone knows everyone knows it, and so on ad infinitum.2 As the definition suggests, common
knowledge is defined based on the notion of propositional knowledge, alias ‘knowing that’.
Beyond ‘knowing that’, recent years have witnessed a growing interest in other types of knowledge, such as ‘knowing
whether’, ‘knowingwhat’, ‘knowing how’, ‘knowingwhy’, ‘knowingwho’, see [15] for an excellent overview. Among
these notions, ‘knowing whether’ is the closest friend of ‘knowing that’. The notion of ‘Knowing whether’ is used
frequently to specify knowledge goals and preconditions for actions, see e.g. [8, 11, 12]. Besides, ‘knowing whether’
corresponds to an important notion of philosophy, that is, non-contingency, the negation of contingency, which dates
back to Aristotle [3]. An agent knows whether a proposition ϕ holds, if the agents knows that ϕ is true, or the agent
knows that ϕ is false; otherwise, the agent is ignorant about ϕ. A proposition ϕ is non-contingent, if it is necessary
that ϕ, or it is impossible that ϕ; otherwise, ϕ is contingent. Just as ‘knowing that’ is the epistemic counterpart of
necessity, ‘knowing whether’ is the epistemic counterpart of non-contingency. For an overview of contingency and
‘knowing whether’, we recommend [6].
It is therefore natural to ask what the notion of ‘commonly knowing whether’, namely, common knowledge based on
‘knowing whether’ is, in contrast to the notion of common knowledge based on ‘knowing that’. It is worth noting
that ‘commonly knowing whether’ cannot be replaced by that of common knowledge, or at least, is not equivalent to
common knowledge. There are a bunch of examples in real life. For instance, you see two ladies chatting beside a
window. So you know that they commonly know whether it is sunny outside, but you do not know that they commonly
know that it is sunny outside since you do not see the weather through the window. For another example, consider
the classic example of muddy children puzzle with some adaptions. Several children are playing outside, and only
one child has mud on his/her forehead. Suppose the father lies to them: “Any of you are clean on his/her forehead”.
Suppose that the mud child trusts the father. Now it is the only possibility for the mud child that “at least one of you
has mud on his/her forehead” (denoted q) is false, thus the mud child, as a single-agent set, commonly know whether
q, but neither q nor the negation of q is common knowledge among the set (since q is actually true but the mud child
∗Jie Fan and Xingchi Su are main authors of this paper.
2This so-called ‘iterate approach’, attributed to [7], is the most common and orthodox view of common knowledge. There are
also approaches called ‘the fixed-point approach’ and ‘the shared-environment approach’, see [2] for the comparisons among the
three approaches and also for related references.
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thinks q is possibly false). This indicates that the notion of commonly knowing whether has some advantage over
common knowledge in some situations.
There has been no unanimous agreement yet on the formal definition of ‘commonly knowing whether’. As we will
show, there are at least five definitions for this notion, which are not logically equivalent over various frame classes.
Also, we will demonstrate that one of the definitions is not expressible with common knowledge.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives five definitions for the notion of ‘commonly
knowing whether’, which are based on distinct intuitions. Section 3 compares their implicational powers in the single-
agent and also multi-agent cases. Section 4 gives an axiomatization and demonstrates its soundness and completeness.
Section 5 explores the relative expressivity of one of the five definitions, via a strategy of modal comparison games.
Moreover, we explore some special properties of Cw5 over binary trees in Section 6. Finally, we conclude with some
future work in Section 7.
2 Definitions of ‘Commonly Knowing Whether’ (Cw)
This section presents some definitions for the notion of ‘commonly knowing whether’. To begin with, we fix a
denumerable set of propositional variables P and a nonempty finite set of agents G. We use G
+
to refer to the set of
finite and nonempty sequences only consisting of agents from G, and |G| to refer to the number of agents in G. The
languages involved in this paper are defined recursively as follows:
PLKwCw ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kwiϕ | Ewϕ | Cwϕ
PLKC ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kiϕ | Eϕ | Cϕ
where p ∈ P, and i ∈ G. In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we only concern G but not any of its proper subsets.
Intuitively, Kwiϕ is read “agent i knows whether ϕ”, Ewϕ is read “everyone knows whether ϕ”, Cwϕ is read “a set
of agents commonly knows whether ϕ”, and Ki,E,C are more familiar operators of individual knowledge, general
knowledge, and common knowledge, respectively.
As noted in the introduction, according to the iterate approach, common knowledge is defined as infinite iteration of
general knowledge (namely ‘everyone knows’). Similarly, we can give an iterate approach to commonly knowing
whether, according to which commonly knowing whether amounts to infinite iteration of ‘everyone knows whether’.
For this, we need to define the notion of ‘everyone knowing whether’. One definition for ‘everyone knowing whether’
is similar to the notion of ‘everyone knows’, that is, to say everyone in a group knows whether ϕ, if every agent in the
group knows whether ϕ (Def. 2). This is seemingly the most natural notion of ‘everyone knowing whether’. Another
definition for ‘everyone knowing whether’ is similar to (individual) knowing whether; namely, everyone in a group
knows whether ϕ, if everyone in the group knows that ϕ is true, or everyone in the group knows that ϕ is false (Def. 1).
Definition 1 Ew1ϕ := Eϕ ∨ E¬ϕ
Definition 2 Ew2ϕ :=
∧
i∈G
Kwiϕ
It should be easy to check that Ew1 is stronger than Ew2. This can be informally explained as follows: for any agent,
if (s)he knows ϕ or knows ¬ϕ, then (s)he knows whether ϕ is true; however, the other direction fails, because it is
possible that some agents know that ϕ is true but others know that ϕ is false.
Based on the above definitions of ‘everyone knowing whether’ and common knowledge, we propose the following
possible definitions for ‘commonly knowing whether’.
Definition 3 Cw1ϕ := Cϕ ∨ C¬ϕ
The definition of Cw1 is structurally similar to that of Ew1. Intuitively, it says that a group commonly knows whether ϕ,
if the group has either common knowledge of ϕ or has common knowledge of the negation of ϕ. Cw1 corresponds to
the notion of ‘commonly knowing whether’ in the sunny weather example in the introduction. Besides, this definition
may also find applications in question-answer contexts. suppose that Sue is attending a conference and asking the
speaker a question: “Is q true or false?” No matter whether the speaker says ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, all attendees will commonly
know whether p. Since if the speaker says ‘Yes’, then the attendees will commonly know that p is true; otherwise, the
attendees will commonly know that p is false. The answer of the speaker amounts to an announcement whether p [13]
(depending on the truth value of p), which leads to the common knowledge as to the truth value of p.
Definition 4 Cw2ϕ := CEwϕ
2
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According to this definition, a group commonly knows whether ϕ, if it is common knowledge that everyone knows
whether ϕ. Since there are two different definitions of Ew, we have also two different definitions of Cw2, that is,
Cw21ϕ := CEw1ϕ and Cw22ϕ := CEw2ϕ.
Definition 5 Cw3ϕ :=
∧
k≥1(Ew)
kϕ
This is the iterated approach to commonly knowing whether: a group commonly knows whether ϕ, if everyone (in
the group) knows whether ϕ, everyone knows whether everyone knows whether ϕ, everyone knows whether everyone
knows whether everyone knows whether ϕ, and so on ad infinitum. Cw3 corresponds to the notion of ‘commonly
knowing whether’ in the muddy children example in the introduction. As indicated in that example, neither q nor
¬q is common knowledge among the single-agent set of the mud child, thus Cw3 is not stronger than Cw1. Again,
because there are two different definitions of Ew, we have also two different definitions of Cw3, that is, Cw31ϕ :=∧
k≥1(Ew1)
kϕ and Cw32ϕ :=
∧
k≥1(Ew2)
kϕ.
Definition 6 Cw4ϕ :=
∧
i∈G
Cw1Kwiϕ, that is, Cw4ϕ :=
∧
i∈G
(CKwiϕ ∨ C¬Kwiϕ)
According to this definition, a group commonly knows whether ϕ, if for every member (in the group), it is common
knowledge that (s)he knows whether ϕ or it is common knowledge that (s)he does not know whether ϕ.
Definition 7 Cw5ϕ :=
∧
s∈G
+ Kwsϕ, where Kwsϕ := Kws1 . . .Kwsnϕ if s = s1 . . . sn is a nonempty sequence of
agents.
This definition is inspired by the hierarchy of inter-knowledge of a group given in [10]. According to this definition,
‘commonly knowingwhether’ amounts to listing all the possible inter-‘knowingwhether’ states among every nonempty
subset of the group. .
3 Implication Relations among the definitions of Cw
This section explores the implication relations among the above five definitions of ‘commonly knowing whether’. The
semantics of PLKwCw and PLKC are interpreted over Kripke models. A (Kripke) model is a tupleM = 〈W, {Ri |
i ∈ G}, V 〉, whereW is a nonempty set of (possible) worlds (also called ‘states’), Ri is an accessibility relation for
each agent i, and V is a valuation function assigning a set of possible worlds to each propositional variable in P. We
say that (M, s) is a pointed model, if M is a model and s is a world in M. We use → to denote the union of all
Ri for i ∈ G, and։ to denote the reflexive-transitive closure of→, that is, ։=
⋃
n∈N →
n. A (Kripke) frame is a
model without valuations. Moreover, we use K, T , KD45, and S5 to denote the class of all Kripke frames, the class
of reflexive frames, the class of serial, transitive and Euclidean frames, and the class of reflexive and Euclidean frames,
respectively.
Given a modelM = 〈W, {Ri | i ∈ G}, V 〉 and a world w ∈ W , the semantics of PLKwCw and PLKC are defined
inductively as follows (we do not list the semantics of Ew and Cw due to their alternative definitions).
Definition 8 The truth conditions for the formulas in PLKwCw and PLKC are shown as follows:
• M, w  p⇔ w ∈ V (p)
• M, w  ¬ϕ⇔M, w 2 ϕ
• M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔M, w  ϕ andM, w  ψ
• M, w  Kwiϕ⇔ for all u, v ∈ W, if wRiu and wRiv, then (M, u  ϕ ⇐⇒ M, v  ϕ)
• M, w  Kiϕ⇔ for all u ∈W, if wRiu, thenM, u  ϕ
• M, w  Eϕ⇔ for all u ∈W, if w→ u, thenM, u  ϕ
• M, w  Cϕ⇔ for all u ∈ W, if w ։ u, thenM, u  ϕ
Notions of satisfiability and validity are defined as normal. For instance, we say that ϕ is valid over the class of frames
C, written C  ϕ, if for all frames F in C, for all modelsM based on F , for all worlds w inM, we haveM, s  ϕ;
we say that ϕ is valid, if ϕ is valid over the class of all frames K.
The following result will simplify the later proofs. We omit the proof details due to the space limitation.
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Proposition 1 1.  Cϕ→ CEϕ
2.  ϕ→ ψ implies  Cϕ→ Cψ.
3.1 Single-agent Case
This part investigates the implication relations among definitions of ‘commonly knowing whether’. First, we explore
the implication relations between the two definitions of ‘everyone knowing whether’. It turns out that Ew1 and Ew2
are equivalent in the single-agent case.
Proposition 2 If |G| = 1, then for any ϕ,  Ew1ϕ↔ Ew2ϕ.
Proof 1 Let |G| = 1, say G = {i}. In this case, Ew2ϕ is just Kwiϕ. Also,  Eϕ ↔ Kiϕ, and  E¬ϕ ↔ Ki¬ϕ, and
thus  Eϕ ∨ E¬ϕ↔ Kiϕ ∨ Ki¬ϕ, that is,  Ew1ϕ↔ Ew2ϕ.
This tells us that in the single-agent case, we do not need to distinguish between Cw21 and Cw22, and between Cw31
and Cw32, and thus we only talk about Cw2 and Cw3, respectively, when only one agent is involved. In the reminder
of this subsection, we assume G to be a single-agent set {i}.
Proposition 3  Cw1ϕ→ Cw2ϕ,  Cw2ϕ→ Cw3ϕ, and therefore,  Cw1ϕ→ Cw3ϕ.
Proof 2 Since  Cϕ → CEϕ, and  CEϕ → CEwϕ (because  Eϕ → Ewϕ), we have  Cϕ → CEwϕ. Similarly,
we obtain  C¬ϕ → CEw¬ϕ. It is easy to see that  Ewϕ ↔ Ew¬ϕ. Therefore,  Cϕ ∨ C¬ϕ → CEwϕ, i.e.,
 Cw1ϕ→ Cw2ϕ.
Moreover, since CEwϕ = Ewϕ∧EEwϕ∧ · · ·, and  Eϕ→ Ewϕ, we can show that  CEwϕ→ Ewϕ∧EwEwϕ∧ · · ·,
that is,  Cw2ϕ→ Cw3ϕ.
Proposition 4 2 Cw2ϕ→ Cw1ϕ.
Proof 3 Consider the following modelM:
s : ¬p i // t : p
Clearly,M, s  Kip andM, t  Kip. ThenM, s  Ep andM, t  Ep. We can obtain thatM, s  CEwp. However,
M, s 2 Cp ∨ C¬p: Since M, s 2 p, we have M, s 2 Cp; since M, t 2 ¬p, we have M, s 2 C¬p. Therefore,
2 Cw2p→ Cw1p.
Proposition 5 2 Cw3ϕ→ Cw2ϕ, and thus 2 Cw3ϕ→ Cw1ϕ.
Proof 4 Consider the following modelN :
s : p i // t : ¬poo
i

Since s has only one successor, N , s  Kwiϕ for all ϕ, thus N , s  Ewϕ for all ϕ, and hence N , s  Cw3ϕ. In
particular,N , s  Cw3p.
However,N , t 2 Kwip, thusN , t 2 Ewp, and then N , s 2 CEwp, that is, N , s 2 Cw2p. Therefore, 2 Cw3p→ Cw2p.
Proposition 6  Cw2ϕ→ Cw4ϕ. As a corollary,  Cw1ϕ→ Cw4ϕ.
Proof 5 Since  CEwϕ↔ CKwiϕ, whereas  Cw1Kwiϕ↔ (CKwiϕ ∨ C¬Kwiϕ), therefore  CEwϕ→ (CKwiϕ ∨
C¬Kwiϕ), that is,  Cw2ϕ→ Cw4ϕ.
Proposition 7 2 Cw3ϕ→ Cw4ϕ.
Proof 6 Consider the model N in the proof of Prop. 5 again. On the one hand, we have shown that N , s  Cw3p.
On the other hand, since N , t 2 Kwip, we have that N , s 2 CKwip; moreover, becauseN , s 2 ¬Kwip, we infer that
N , s 2 C¬Kwip, which implies thatN , s 2 Cw4p. Therefore, 2 Cw3p→ Cw4p.
Proposition 8 2 Cw4ϕ→ Cw3ϕ. As a corollary, 2 Cw4ϕ→ Cw2ϕ and 2 Cw4ϕ→ Cw1ϕ.
4
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Cw1 // Cw2 //

Cw3

Cw4 Cw5
OO
Figure 1: Logical relationships in the single-agent case
Proof 7 Consider the following model:
s : p
i

i // t : ¬p
i

oo
It is easy to check that s  ¬Kwip and t  ¬Kwip, from which we can obtain s  C¬Kwip. Then s  Cw4p.
However, since s 2 Kwip, we have s 2 Ewp, i.e. s 2 Cw3p. Therefore, 2 Cw4p→ Cw3p.
From the proofs of the Props. 6 and 8, it follows that even on S5-models, Cw4 is not logically equivalent to Cw1, Cw2
and Cw3.
Proposition 9  Cw3ϕ↔ Cw5ϕ.
Proof 8 Since in the case that G = {i},  Ewϕ↔ Kwiϕ, we have  Cw3ϕ↔
∧
k≥1(Kwi)
kϕ. Moreover,  Cw5ϕ↔
(Kwiϕ ∧ KwiKwiϕ ∧ · · ·). So,  Cw3ϕ↔ Cw5ϕ.
Summarize the main results of this subsection as follows.
Theorem 1 In the single-agent case, the logical relationships among Cw1, Cw2, Cw3, Cw4 and Cw5 are shown in
Fig. 1, where an arrow from one operator O to anotherO′ means that for all ϕ, Oϕ→ O′ϕ is valid over the class of
frames in question, and the arrows are transitive.
3.2 Multi-agent Cases
Now we move on to the multi-agent cases, that is, the cases when |G| > 1. As explained before, it is possible that
some agents knows that ϕ is true but others know that ϕ is false, thus Ew1 is stronger than Ew2.
Proposition 10 The following statements hold:
(a)  Ew1ϕ→ Ew2ϕ;
(b) 2 Ew2ϕ→ Ew1ϕ.
Proof 9 (a) is straightforward by definitions of Ew1 and Ew2 and the semantics. For (b), consider the following model
M:
s : p
i

j // t : ¬p
It is clear thatM, s  Kwip ∧ Kwjp, thusM, s  Ew2p. However,M, s 2 Ep andM, s 2 E¬p, thusM, s 2 Ew1p.
Therefore, 2 Ew2p→ Ew1p.
Due to Prop. 10, in the multi-agent cases, we need to distinguish between Ew1 and Ew2, and thus need to distinguish
between Cw21 and Cw22, and also between Cw31 and Cw32.
The following is the main result in this part.
Theorem 2 In the multi-agent cases, the logical relationships among Cw1, Cw21, Cw22, Cw31, Cw32, Cw4 and Cw5
are shown in Fig. 2.
Proposition 11  Cw1ϕ→ Cw21ϕ,  Cw21ϕ→ Cw22ϕ. Consequently,  Cw1ϕ→ Cw22ϕ.
5
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Cw5
Cw1 // Cw21 //
&&◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
Cw22
88♣♣♣♣♣♣♣
&&◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
// Cw4
Cw31 Cw32
Figure 2: Logical relationships in the multi-agent cases
Proof 10 The first part is immediate from Prop. 3.
Moreover, as  Ew1ϕ→ Ew2ϕ (by Prop. 10 (a)), thus  CEw1ϕ→ CEw2ϕ, that is,  Cw21ϕ→ Cw22ϕ.
Proposition 12  Cw21ϕ→ Cw31ϕ,  Cw22ϕ→ Cw32ϕ. As a consequence,  Cw21ϕ→ Cw32ϕ.
Proof 11 Similar to the proof in Prop. 3.
Proposition 13 2 Cw22ϕ→ Cw31ϕ. As a consequence, 2 Cw22ϕ→ Cw21ϕ.
Proof 12 Consider the modelM in the proof of Prop. 10 (b).
We have seen that M, s  Ew2p. Moreover, it is obvious that M, t  Ew2p, and thus M, s  CEw2p. However,
M, s 2 Ep andM, s 2 E¬p, thusM, s 2 Ew1p, and henceM, s 2 Cw31p. Therefore, 2 Cw22p→ Cw31p.
Proposition 14 2 Cw31ϕ→ Cw32ϕ. As a result, 2 Cw31ϕ→ Cw22ϕ.
Proof 13 Consider the following model:
t3 : p t4 : ¬p
t1 : p
i
OO i
00
s : pioo i // t2 : p
i
OOj
nn
Firstly, s  Cw31p. To see this, notice that s  Ew1p. Since M, t1 2 Ew1p and M, t2 2 Ew1p, we infer that
M, s  Ew1Ew1p. Moreover, as t3 and t4 both have no successors, t3  Ew1ϕ and t4  Ew1ϕ for all ϕ, then
t1  Ew1Ew1ϕ and t2  Ew1Ew1ϕ, and therefore s  Ew1Ew1Ew1ϕ for all ϕ. This implies that s  Cw31p.
Secondly, s 2 Cw32p. To see this, note that t1 2 Ew2p and t2  Ew2p. This implies that s 2 Ew2Ew2p, and therefore
s 2 Cw32p. Now we conclude that 2 Cw31p→ Cw32p.
Proposition 15 2 Cw32ϕ→ Cw31ϕ.
Proof 14 Use the model M in the proof of Prop. 10 (b). We have seen there that M, s 2 Ew1p, and thus M, s 2
Cw31p.
Moreover, as s has only one i-successor and only one j-successor, we haveM, s  Kwiϕ ∧ Kwjϕ for all ϕ, that is,
M, s  Ew2ϕ for all ϕ, and thusM, s  Cw32ϕ for all ϕ, henceM, s  Cw32p. Therefore, 2 Cw32p→ Cw31p.
Proposition 16 2 Cw21ϕ→ Cw1ϕ, and thus 2 Cw22ϕ→ Cw1ϕ.
Proof 15 Similar to the proof of Prop. 4.
Proposition 17 2 Cw31ϕ→ Cw21ϕ, and 2 Cw32ϕ→ Cw22ϕ.
Proof 16 Similar to the proof of Prop. 5.
Proposition 18  Cw22ϕ→ Cw4ϕ, and thus  Cw21ϕ→ Cw4ϕ.
Proof 17 By definition of Ew2, we have  Ew2ϕ ↔
∧
i∈G
Kwiϕ, then  CEw2ϕ ↔ C
∧
i∈G
Kwiϕ, that is, 
CEw2ϕ↔
∧
i∈G
CKwiϕ, and thus  Cw22ϕ→ Cw4ϕ.
6
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Proposition 19 2 Cw4ϕ → Cw32ϕ and 2 Cw4ϕ→ Cw31ϕ. Consequently, 2 Cw4ϕ→ Cw22ϕ, 2 Cw4ϕ→ Cw21ϕ,
2 Cw4ϕ→ Cw1ϕ.
Proof 18 Consider the model in the proof of Prop. 8. We have already seen that s  Cw4p.
However, since s 2 Kwip, thus s 2 Ew2p, which implies that s 2 Ew1p due to Prop. 10 (a). It follows that s 2 Cw32p
and s 2 Cw31p. Therefore, 2 Cw4p→ Cw32p and 2 Cw4p→ Cw31p.
Proposition 20  Cw22ϕ→ Cw5ϕ.
Proof 19 Let M = 〈W, {Ri | i ∈ G}, V 〉 be a model and w ∈ W . Suppose that M, w  Cw22ϕ, to show that
M, w  Cw5ϕ, that is,M, w 
∧
s∈G+ Kwsϕ. Let s ∈ G
+ be arbitrary. It suffices to prove thatM, w  Kwsϕ. For
this, we show a stronger result: (∗) for any u such that w ։ u, we have that M, u  Kwsϕ. From this it follows
immediately thatM, w  Kwsϕ due to the fact that w ։ w.
We proceed by induction on the length of s, denoted by |s|. By supposition, for all u such that w ։ u, we have
M, u 
∧
i∈G
Kwiϕ.
Base step: |s| = 1. We may assume that s = i1, where i1 ∈ G. For any u with w ։ u, asM, u 
∧
i∈G
Kwiϕ, we
have obviously thatM, u  Kwi1ϕ. Therefore, (∗) holds.
Induction step: hypothesize that (∗) holds for |s| = k (IH), we prove that (∗) also holds for |s| = k + 1. For this, we
may assume that s = i1i2 · · · ik+1, where im ∈ G form ∈ [1, k + 1].
For all u such that w ։ u, for all v such that uRi1v, we have w ։ v. Note that |i2 · · · ik+1| = k. Then by IH, we
derive thatM, v  Kwi2···ik+1ϕ, and therefore,M, u  Kwi1i2···ik+1ϕ, that is, M, u  Kwsϕ. We have now shown
(∗), as desired.
Proposition 21 2 Cw32ϕ→ Cw5ϕ. As a consequence, 2 Cw32ϕ→ Cw22ϕ.
Proof 20 Consider the following model:
s : p i //
i
PP
PP
PP
''PP
PP
PP
P
t : p i,j //
j
$$
v : p
u : p i,j //
i
99
w : ¬p
In this model, on one hand, s  Cw32p: note that s  Ew2p is easily verified; since t 2 Kwjp, thus t 2 Ew2p, similarly,
since u 2 Kwip, thus u 2 Ew2p, from which it follows that s  Ew2Ew2p. Moreover, since both v and w have no
successors, Ew2p ∧ Ew2Ew2p ∧ · · · holds at both v and w, then Ew2Ew2p ∧ Ew2Ew2Ew2p ∧ · · · holds at both t and
u. Therefore, s  Ew2Ew2Ew2p ∧ Ew2Ew2Ew2Ew2p ∧ · · ·, as desired.
On the other hand, t  Kwip but u 2 Kwip, and hence s 2 KwiKwip. This entails that s 2 Cw5p, as desired.
Proposition 22 2 Cw5ϕ→ Cw32ϕ.
Proof 21 Consider the following model:
v1 : p v2 : ¬p v3 : p v4 : ¬p
u1 : p
i
OO
i
EE
u2 : p
j
OO
j
YY
u3 : p u4 : p
i,j❏❏❏❏
ee❏❏❏
i,j
OO
t1 : p
i❏❏❏❏
dd❏❏❏❏
i
OO
t2 : p
i
OO
itttt
::tttt
s : p
i■■■■■
dd■■■■
i✈✈✈✈✈
;;✈✈✈✈
We now show thatM, s  Cw5p butM, s 2 Cw32p.
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One may easily see thatM, s  Kwjϕ for all ϕ, and s  Kwip, thus s  Kwip∧Kwjp. Moreover, t1 and t2 both satisfy
Kwjϕ for all ϕ and Kwip, and then s  KwiKwip∧KwiKwjp. Besides, u1  ¬Kwip∧Kwjp and u2  Kwip∧¬Kwjp,
which implies that t1  ¬KwiKwip ∧ ¬KwiKwjp; u3  Kwiϕ ∧ Kwjϕ for any ϕ, u4  ¬Kwip ∧ ¬Kwjp, thus
t2  ¬KwiKwip ∧ ¬KwiKwjp, and hence s  KwiKwiKwip ∧ KwiKwiKwjp. Of course s  KwiKwjϕ for all ϕ,
thus s  KwiKwjKwip ∧ KwiKwjKwjp. Because v1, v2, v3, v4 all satisfy Kwaϕ for all ϕ and a, we can obtain that
s  KwaKwbKwcKwdϕ for all a, b, c, d ∈ G. Therefore,M, s  Cw5p.
Since uk 2 Kwip ∧ Kwjp for k = 1, 2, thus t1  KwiEw2p, and then t1  KwiEw2p ∧ KwjEw2p, i.e. t1  Ew2Ew2p.
However, u3  Ew2p and u4 2 Ew2p, which entails that t2 2 Kw1Ew2p, and thus t2 2 Ew2Ew2p. Therefore,
s 2 KwiEw2Ew2p, and thus s 2 Ew2Ew2Ew2p. This leads toM, s 2 Cw32p.
Proposition 23 2 Cw31ϕ→ Cw5ϕ.
Proof 22 Consider the model in the proof of Prop. 21. It has been shown there that s 2 Cw5p. It then suffices to prove
that s  Cw31p.
As s  Kip and s  Kjϕ for all ϕ, we obtain s  Ep, and thus s  Ew1p. Since t 2 Ep ∨ E¬p and u 2 Ep ∨ E¬p, we
can show that s  E¬Ew1p, and then s  Ew1Ew1p. Moreover, because v and w both have no successors, v  Ew1ϕ
andw  Ew1ϕ for all ϕ, thus t  Ew1Ew1ϕ and u  Ew1Ew1ϕ, and hence s  Ew1Ew1Ew1ϕ for all ϕ. This together
gives us s  Cw31p.
Proposition 24 2 Cw5ϕ→ Cw31ϕ.
Proof 23 Consider the model in the proof of Prop. 22. It has been shown there that s  Cw5p. The remainder is to
show that s 2 Cw31p. The proof is as follows.
One may check that Ew1p is true at u3 but false at u1, u2, u4. It then follows that t1  Ew1Ew1p but t2 2 Ew1Ew1p,
and therefore s 2 Ew1Ew1Ew1p, which implies that s 2 Cw31p, as desired.
Proposition 25 2 Cw32ϕ→ Cw4ϕ.
Proof 24 Use the model in the proof of Prop. 21. It has been shown there that s  Cw32p.
Moreover, s 2 Cw4p. To see this, note that t 2 ¬Kwip and u 2 Kwip. This entails that s 2 CKwip ∨ C¬Kwip.
Therefore, s 2 Cw4p.
Proposition 26 2 Cw31ϕ→ Cw4ϕ.
Proof 25 Use the model in the proof of Prop. 21. By Prop. 25, we have s 2 Cw4p. By Prop. 23, we obtain s  Cw31p.
Therefore, 2 Cw31p→ Cw4p.
Proposition 27 2 Cw4ϕ→ Cw5ϕ.
Proof 26 Consider the model in the proof of Prop. 8. We have seen thatM, s |= Cw4p. However, asM, s  ¬Kwip,
we can obtain thatM, s 2 Cw5p. So, 2 Cw4p→ Cw5p.
Proposition 28 2 Cw5ϕ→ Cw4ϕ.
Proof 27 Use the model in the proof of Prop. 22. There, we have shown that M, s  Cw5p. It is now sufficient to
prove thatM, s 2 Cw4p.
Note that u1 2 Kwip and u3 2 ¬Kwip. This gives us s 2 CKwip ∨ C¬Kwip, and therefore s 2 Cw4p.
We have thus completed the proof of Thm. 1. Note that all proofs involved are based onK. In fact, we can also explore
the implication relations of Cw1−Cw5 overKD45, over T , and also over S5. It turns out that the implication relations
over KD45 is the same as those over K (see Fig. 2), and the implication relations over T and S5 is figured as follows
(see Fig. 3). We omit the proof details due to the space limitation.
Therefore, Cw1, Cw2, Cw3 and Cw5 boil down to the same thing once the frame is reflexive, which can be attributed
to agents’ agreements on the values of ϕ. For example, if there is M, s |= Kwiϕ ∧ Kwjϕ where M is reflexive,
the values of ϕ on all i-successors must agree with those on all j-successors since they share a common successor s.
Comparatively, ifM is not reflexive, the case ofM, s |= Kiϕ ∧ Kj¬ϕ is possible.
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Cw1
//

Cw21
//oo Cw22oo // Cw31 //oo Cw32 //oo Cw5oo
Cw4
Figure 3: Logical relationships over T and S5 (multi-agent).
4 Axiomatization
S5 is the class of frames specifically for knowledge or epistemic description. As mentioned above, over S5, the five
definitions of ‘commonly knowing whether’ are logically equivalent except Cw4. Also, one may verify that Ew1 and
Ew2 are logically equivalent over S5. In this section, we axiomatize PLKwCw over S5. The language PLKwCw can
now be defined recursively as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kwiϕ | Cwϕ,
where Cw means Cw1, and Ewϕ abbreviates
∧
i∈G
Kwiϕ.
The semantics of PLKwCw is defined as before in addition to the semantics of Cw as follows.
Definition 9 M, w  Cwϕ⇔ for all u, v, if w։ u and w։ v, then (M, u  ϕ ⇐⇒ M, v  ϕ).
4.1 Proof system and Soundness
The proof system PLCKW5 is an extension of the axiom system of the logic of ‘knowing whether’ CLS5 in [6] plus
the axioms and rules concerning Cw.
Definition 10 The axiomatization of PLCKWS5 consists of the following axiom schemas and inference rules:
TAUT
Kwi(χ→ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(¬χ→ ϕ)→ Kwiϕ (Kw-CON)
Kwiϕ→ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∨ Kwi(¬ϕ→ χ) (Kw-DIS)
Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ→ Kwiψ (Kw-T)
¬Kwiϕ→ Kwi¬Kwiϕ (wKw-5)
Cw(χ→ ϕ) ∧ Cw(¬χ→ ϕ)→ Cwϕ (Cw-CON)
Cwϕ→ Cw(ϕ→ ψ) ∨ Cw(¬ϕ→ χ) (Cw-DIS)
Cwϕ ∧ Cw(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ→ Cwψ (Cw-T)
Cwϕ→ (Ewϕ ∧ EwCwϕ) (Cw-Mix)
Cw(ϕ→ Ewϕ)→ (ϕ→ Cwϕ) (Cw-Ind)
from ϕ infer Kwiϕ (Kw-NEC)
from ϕ infer Cwϕ (Cw-NEC)
from ϕ↔ ψ infer Kwiϕ↔ Kwiψ (Kw-RE)
from ϕ↔ ψ infer Cwϕ↔ Cwψ (Cw-RE)
from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ (MP)
Proposition 29 PLCKWS5 is sound with respect to S5.
Proof 28 The soundness of the axioms (Kw-CON), (Kw-DIS), (Kw-T), (wKw-5) and the soundness of the rules (Kw-
NEC), (Kw-RE), (MP) are already proved in [6]. Moreover, the soundness of (Cw-CON), (Cw-DIS), (Cw-T), (Cw-
NEC) and (Cw-RE) can be shown as their Kw-counterparts. It suffices to show the soundness of (Cw-Mix) and
(Cw-Ind). LetM = 〈W, {Ri | i ∈ G}, V 〉 be an arbitrary S5-model and w ∈ W .
For (Cw-Mix): Suppose thatM, w  Cwϕ, to show thatM, w  Ewϕ∧EwCwϕ. We only show thatM, w  EwCwϕ,
sinceM, w  Ewϕ is straightforward.
If M, w 2 EwCwϕ, then for some i ∈ G and some u, v such that wRiu and wRiv we have M, u  Cwϕ and
M, v 2 Cwϕ. Then there exist v1, v2 such that v ։ v1 and v ։ v2 andM, v1  ϕ andM, v2 2 ϕ. Then w ։ v1
and w ։ v2, and thereforeM, w 2 Cwϕ, which is contrary to the supposition.
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For (Cw-Ind): Suppose that M, w  Cw(ϕ → Ewϕ) ∧ ϕ. We show a stronger result: (∗): for all u such that
w ։ u, we haveM, u  ϕ; equivalently, for all n ∈ N, for all u such that w →n u, we have M, u  ϕ (Recall
that։=
⋃
n∈N →
n). From M, w  Cw(ϕ → Ewϕ), it follows that either (1) for all u such that w ։ u we have
M, u  ϕ → Ewϕ or (2) for all u such that w ։ u we haveM, u  ϕ ∧ ¬Ewϕ. The case (2) immediately gives us
(∗). In the remainder, it suffices to consider the case (1).
We proceed with induction on n.
Base step (i.e. n = 0). In this case, we need to show thatM, w  ϕ. This follows directly from the supposition.
Inductive step. Assume by induction hypothesis (IH) that (∗) holds for n = k. We show that (∗) also holds for
n = k + 1. Hypothesize that w →k+1 u, then there exists v such that w →k v → u. By IH,M, v  ϕ. Obviously,
w ։ v, then using (1) we infer that M, v  ϕ → Ewϕ, thus M, v  Ewϕ. Together with the fact that M, v  ϕ
and the reflexivity of→ (since Ri is reflexive for all i ∈ G), this would implies that for all x such that v → x we have
M, x  ϕ, and thereforeM, u  ϕ, as desired.
4.2 Completeness of PLCKWS5
We follow the basic idea on proving completeness of the logic of common knowledge to prove the completeness of
PLCKWS5.
Definition 11 The closure of ϕ, denoted as cl(ϕ), is the smallest set satisfying following conditions:
1. ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ).
2. if ψ ∈ cl(ϕ), then sub(ψ) ⊆ cl(ϕ).
3. if ψ ∈ cl(ϕ) and ψ is not negation, then ¬ψ ∈ cl(ϕ).
4. if Cwψ ∈ cl(ϕ), then {KwiCwψ | i ∈ G} ⊆ cl(ϕ).
5. If Cwψ ∈ cl(ϕ), then {Kwiψ | i ∈ G} ⊆ cl(ϕ).
6. If ¬Kwiψ1 ∈ cl(ϕ), ψ1 is not a negation and Cwψ2 ∈ cl(ϕ), then Kwi¬(ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2) ∈ cl(ϕ).
The definition of the canonical model for PLCKWS5 is inspired by the canonical models of CLS5 in [6], where the
definition of the canonical relation is inspired by an almost schema.
Definition 12 Φ is a closure of some formula. We define the canonical model based on Φ asMc = 〈W c, {RTi | i ∈
G}, V c〉 where:
1. W c = {Σ | Σ is maximal consistent in Φ}.
2. For each i ∈ G, let RTi be the reflexive closure of R
c
i , where ΣR
c
i∆ iff there exists an χ, such that:
(a) ¬Kwiχ ∈ Σ and
(b) for all ϕ ∈ Φ: (Kwiϕ ∈ Σ and Kwi¬(ϕ ∧ ¬χ) ∈ Σ) implies ϕ ∈ ∆.
3. V c(p) = {Σ ∈ W c | p ∈ Σ}.
Here, it should be noticed that it has already been proved that RTi is an equivalence relation in [6], which means we
no longer need the transitive and symmetric closure.
Lemma 1 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma) Let Φ be the closure of some formula. Every consistent subset of Φ is a subset of
a maximal consistent set in Φ.
The proof of Lemma 1 is standard. In order to prove the completeness of PLCKWS5, we refer to the basic idea of the
completeness of classical common knowledge in [14] and [5] and Lemma 2 should be proved in advance.
Definition 13 (α-path) In the canonical model M c, if Σ ։ ∆, then the sequence of maximal-consistent sets l =
〈Γ0,Γ1, · · · ,Γn〉 satisfying following two conditions:
3
3Here we abuse the notation and use։ to denote the reflexive-transitive closure of the union of the canonical relations.
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1. Σ = Γ0,∆ = Γn;
2. for any k (0 ≤ k < n), there is an agent i ∈ G such that ΓkRTi Γk+1;
3. for anym (0 ≤ m ≤ n), α ∈ Γm.
is an α-path from Σ to ∆.
Lemma 2 If Cwϕ ∈ Φ, then Cwϕ ∈ Σ iff every path from Σ is a ϕ-path or every path from Σ is a ¬ϕ-path.
Proof 29 (⇒) Proof by induction on the length n of the path. We have to prove a stronger lemma: Cwϕ ∈ Σ iff every
path from Σ is a ϕ-path and a Cwϕ-path or every path from Σ is a ¬ϕ-path and Cw-path.
When n = 0, l = 〈Σ〉. Since Σ is maximal consistent, ϕ ∈ Σ or ¬ϕ ∈ Σ. And Cwϕ ∈ Σ is our premise.
Induction hypothesis: If Cwϕ ∈ Σ, then every path of length n is a ϕ-path and a Cwϕ-path or every path of length n
is a ¬ϕ-path and a Cwϕ-path.
Induction Step: Assume ln = 〈Σ0,Σ1, ...,Σn〉 is a ϕ-path and Cwϕ-path. Take a path of length (n + 1) from Σ. By
induction hypothesis, Cwϕ ∈ Σn. Let i be the agent such thatΣnRTi Σn+1. Since PLCKWS5 ⊢ Cwϕ→ EwCwϕ and
PLCKWS5 ⊢ EwCwϕ→ KwiCwϕ, it must be the case that KwiCwϕ ∈ Σn. Suppose ϕ 6∈ Σn+1. By the definition of
RTi , ¬Kwiϕ ∨ ¬Kwi(χ → ϕ) ∈ Σn. Since Kwiϕ ∈ Σn, ¬Kwi(χ → ϕ) ∈ Σn. Thus, ¬Kwi(¬ϕ → ¬χ) ∈ Σn. By
(Kw-DIS), Kwi(ϕ → χ) ∈ Σn. By (Kw-T), ¬ϕ ∈ Σn. Contradiction. Thus, ϕ ∈ Σn+1. Similarly, we can prove that
Cwϕ ∈ Σn+1. Thus, for any path with (n+1) length, it is a ϕ-path and Cwϕ-path.
Assume ln = 〈Σ0,Σ1, ...,Σn〉 is a ¬ϕ-path and Cwϕ-path. Similarly, we can prove that for any path with (n+1)
length, it is a ¬ϕ-path and Cwϕ-path.
(⇐) Case 1: Suppose that every path from Σ is a ϕ-path. Let Sϕ be the set of all maximal consistent sets∆ in Φ such
that every path from∆ is a ϕ-path. Now consider the formula: χ =
∨
∆∈Sϕ
(
∧
∆).
We prove the following three statements:
1. ⊢
∧
Σ→ χ
2. ⊢ χ→ ϕ
3. ⊢ χ→ Ewχ
As for 1, Σ ⊢ χ since
∧
Σ is one of the disjuncts of χ.
As for 2, note that ϕ ∈ ∆ for every ∆ ∈ Sϕ. Thus, ϕ is a conjunct of every disjunct of χ. Therefore, ⊢ χ→ ϕ.
As for 3, prove by contradiction. Assume χ ∧ ¬Ewχ is consistent. Since χ is a disjunction, there must be a disjunct∧
∆ such that
∧
∆ ∧ ¬Ewχ is consistent. By similar reasoning, there must be an agent i such that
∧
∆ ∧ ¬Kwiχ
is consistent. Since ∆ is maximal consistent, ¬Kwiχ ∈ ∆. And for every Θ ∈ W
c\Sϕ, χ 6∈ Θ. Thus, it must be
the case that ∆RTi Θ by the definition of R
T
i . Since Θ ∈ W
c\Sϕ, there must exist a path from Θ that is not a ϕ-path.
Therefore, there must exist a path from ∆ that is not a ϕ-path. Contradiction. Thus, ⊢ χ→ Ewχ.
From 3, it follows by (Cw-NEC) that⊢ Cw(χ→ Ewχ). By (Cw-Ind), ⊢ χ→ Cwχ. By 1, it implies that⊢
∧
Σ→ Cwχ.
Since
∧
Σ→ χ, ⊢
∧
Σ→ (Cwχ∧χ). By 2 and (Cw-NEC), ⊢ Cw(χ→ ϕ). By (Cw-T) and⊢
∧
Σ→ (Cwχ∧Cw(χ→
ϕ) ∧ χ). Thus, ⊢
∧
Σ→ Cwϕ. Therefore, Cwϕ ∈ Σ.
Case 2: Suppose every path from Σ is a ¬ϕ-path. We can prove Cwϕ ∈ Σ by similar reasoning as Case 1.
Lemma 3 (Truth Lemma) For any PLKwCw-formula ψ, for all Σ ∈ W c, we haveMc,Σ |= ψ iff ψ ∈ Σ.
Proof 30 By induction on ψ:
•When ψ is a Boolean formula or is Kwiϕ, the proof can be shown as in [6].
•When ψ = Cwϕ:
‘Only if’: Suppose that Cwϕ 6∈ Σ. By Lemma 2, there exist two paths l1 and l2 such that l1 is not a ϕ-path and
l2 is not a ¬ϕ-path. Thus, there must be a ∆1 ∈ l1 such that ¬ϕ ∈ ∆1 and a ∆2 ∈ l2 such that ϕ ∈ ∆2. By
induction hypothesis, we haveM c,∆1  ¬ϕ andM c,∆2  ϕ. By the definition 13, Σ ։ ∆1 and Σ ։ ∆2. Thus,
M c,Σ 2 Cwϕ.
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‘If’: AssumeMc,Σ 6|= Cwϕ. By the semantics of Cwϕ, there exist ∆1, ∆2 ∈ W c with Σ ։ ∆1, Σ ։ ∆2, such that
Mc,∆1 |= ϕ andMc,∆2 |= ¬ϕ. By induction hypothesis, ϕ ∈ ∆1 and ¬ϕ ∈ ∆2. Thus, there exist path l1 where
∆1 ∈ l1 such that l1 us not a ¬ϕ-path and there also exist path l2 where ∆2 ∈ l2 such that l2 is not a ϕ-path. By
Lemma 2, Cwϕ 6∈ Σ.
By Lemma 3, we obtain the completeness of PLCKWS5.
Theorem 3 The logic PLCKWS5 is strongly complete with respect to S5.
5 Expressivity
In the remaining part of this paper, we will explore the expressivity of Cw5. The language concerned, denoted
PLKwCw5, are defined recursively as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kwiϕ | Cw5ϕ
Recall that PLKC is defined as follows:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kiϕ | Cϕ
5.1 PLKwCw5 is Bisimulation Invariant
Definition 14 Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 and M ′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 be two Kripke models. A non-empty binary relation
Z ⊆ W × W ′ is called bisimulation between M and M ′, written as M ∼= M ′, if the following conditions are
satisfied:
(i) If wZ ′w′, then w and w′ satisfy the same proposition letters.
(ii) if wZ ′w′ and wRv, then there is a v′ ∈ W ′ such that vZv′ and w′R′v′.
(iii) If wZ ′w′ and w′R′v′, then there exists v ∈W such that vZv′ and wRv.
When Z is a bisimulation linking two states w inM and w′ inM ′, we say that two pointed models are bisimilar and
write Z : (M,w) ∼= (M ′, w′). If a language L cannot distinguish any pair of bisimilar models, L is bisimulation
invariant.
Theorem 4 PLKwCw5 is bisimulation invariant.
Proof 31 By induction on formulas ϕ of PLKwCw5.
When ϕ is a Boolean formula, the proof is classical.
When ϕ = Kwiψ, we prove it in three cases. For arbitrary two bisimilar models (M, r) and (N, t), we have:
• if M, r |= Kwiψ and for all rn with r →M rn, M, rn |= ψ. SinceM, r ∼= N, t, for any tn with t →N tn,
there is an rn such that r →M rn andM, rn ∼= N, tn. By induction hypothesis, ψ is bisimulation invariant.
ThusN, tn |= ψ. So N, t |= Kiψ.
• ifM, r |= Kwiψ and for all rn with r →M rn,M, rn |= ¬ψ, similar to above case.
• ifM, r |= ¬Kwiψ, that means there are r1 with r →M r1 and r2 with r →M r2, such thatM, r1 |= ψ and
M, r2 |= ¬ψ. SinceM, r ∼= N, t, there are t1 with t →N t1 and t2 with t →N t2, such thatM, r1 ∼= N, t1
andM, r2 ∼= N, t2. By induction hypothesis, ψ is bisimulation invariant. Thus N, t1 |= ψ and N, t2 |= ¬ψ.
ThusN, t |= ¬Kwiψ.
Thus,Kwiψ is bisimulation invariant.
When ϕ = Cw5ψ, assume two bisimular models (M, r) and (N, t), such that M, r |= Cw5ψ and N, t |= ¬Cw5ψ.
That means there exists a sequence of agents s, such thatM, r |= Kwsψ andN, t |= ¬Kwsψ. Let s = 〈i1, i2, ..., in〉.
So M, r |= Kwi1γ and N, t |= ¬Kwi1γ, where γ = Kw〈i2,i3,...,in〉ψ. However, we have proved that for any
formula of the form Kwi1γ, they are bisimulation invariant. Thus, if M, r |= Kwi1γ, there must be N, t |= Kwi1γ.
Contradiction.
Therefore, we proved that PLKwCw5 is bisimulation invariant.
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5.2 PLKC and PLKwCw5
Although Cw5 is formed merely with Kw, which can be defined by classical operator K, surprisingly, Cw5 is not
expressible in PLKC. We prove it by constructing two classes of models, which no PLKC-formula can distinguish
whereas some PLKwCw5-formula can. The following definitions and lemmas facilitate our proofs.
Definition 15 (Modal Depth) The modal depth of a PLKC-formula is defined by:
d(p) = 1; d(¬ϕ) = d(ϕ);
d(ϕ ∧ ψ) = max{d(ϕ), d(ψ)}; d(Kϕ) = d(ϕ) + 1;
d(Cϕ) = d(ϕ) + 1.
To construct two classes of models, we first define two kinds of sets of possible worlds.
Definition 16 For every n ≥ 1, we inductively define two sets of possible worlds Tn and Zn, where |j| denotes the
length of the sequence j:
• t00 ∈ Tn and z0 ∈ Zn;
• If ti ∈ Tn, then ti0 ∈ Tn and ti1 ∈ Tn; if zi ∈ Zn, then zi0 ∈ Zn and zi1 ∈ Zn;
• For every tj ∈ Tn, |j| ≤ n+ 2; for every zj ∈ Zn, |j| ≤ n+ 1;
• Tn and Zn have no other possible worlds.
Then we define two classes of models mentioned above.
Definition 17 Define the class of modelsM = {Mn = 〈Wn, Rn, Vn〉 | n ∈ N+}, where
• Wn = Tn ∪ {r, t0},
• Rn = {(ti, ti0), (ti, ti1) | ti ∈ Tn} ∪ {(r, t0), (t0, t00)},
• Vn(p) =Wn − {t0i}, where |i| = n+ 1 and i is a finite sequence of 0s.
The class of modelsN = {Nn = 〈W ′n, R
′
n, V
′
n〉 | n ∈ N
+}, where
• W ′n =Wn ∪ Zn
• R′n = Rn ∪ {(zi, zi0), (zi, zi1) | zi ∈ Zn} ∪ {(r, z0)}
• V ′n(p) = Vn(p) ∪ Zn − {z0i}, where |i| = 1 and i is a finite sequence of 0s.
It is easy to see that for any n ∈ N+,Mn is a submodel of Nn. We will prove that no PLKC-formula can distinguish
M and N with the CL-game, which is defined below.
Definition 18 A CL-game is a game with two players, duplicator and spoiler, playing on a Kripke-model. Given two
Kripke modelsM = 〈W,R, V 〉 andM ′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉, from an arbitrary node w inW and an arbitrary node w′ in
W ′, play games in n rounds between duplicator and spoiler as following rules:
• When n = 0, if the sets of satisfied formulas on node w and w′ are the same, then duplicator wins; otherwise,
spoiler wins.
• When n 6= 0,
– K-move: If spoiler starting from node w does K-move to node x which can be reached by R, then
duplicator starting from w′ doesK-move to a node y inW ′ with the same set of satisfied propositional
variables as x. If spoiler starts from w′, then duplicator starts from w with similar way to move.
– C-move: If spoiler starting from node w does C-move to node x which can be reached by ։, then
duplicator starting from w′ does C-move to a node y in W ′ with same set of satisfied propositional
variables to x. If spoiler starts from w′, then duplicator starts from w with similar way to move.
In the game, for arbitrary x ∈ W and y ∈ W ′, we say (x, y) or (y, x) is a state of CL-game.
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If there is a winning strategy for duplicator in n-round games, (Mn, r) and (Nn, r) agree on allKCL-formulas whose
modal depth is n.
Lemma 4 For arbitrary n ∈ N, duplicator has a winning strategy in the CL-game on (Mn, r) and (Nn, r) in n
rounds.
Proof 32 We describe duplicator’s winning strategy case by case. Starting with the initial state (r, r), we mainly
concerns the case where spoiler does aK-move. Otherwise, duplicator can move to a isomorphic sub-model such that
there must be a winning strategy in following rounds. Thus, the cases below exhaust all possibilities.
• The initial state is (r, r):
– If spoiler does aK-move or a C-move onMn reaching ti, then duplicator does aK-move or a C-move
on Nn to reach the corresponding ti. Since (Mn, ti) ∼= (Nn, ti), there is a winning strategy after this
move.
– If spoiler does aK-move or a C-move onNn reaching ti, then duplicator does aK-move or a C-move
onMn to reach the corresponding ti. Since (Mn, ti) ∼= (Nn, ti), there is a winning strategy after this
move.
– If spoiler does aK-move on Nn reaching z0, duplicator moves to t0.
– If spoiler does aC-move onNn reaching an arbitrary node zi(i6=0) inZn, then duplicator does aC-move
to reach t0i. Since (Mn, t0i) ∼= (Nn, zi), there is a winning strategy after this move.
• The current state is (z0, t0):
– If spoiler does aK-move reaching z00 or z01, then duplicator moves onMn to reach t00.
– If spoiler does aK-move reaching t00 onMn, then duplicator moves to z00 on Nn.
– If spoiler does a C-move reaching zi(i6=0), then duplicator moves to t0i. Since (Mn, t0i) ∼= (Nn, zi),
there is a winning strategy after this move.
– If spoiler does a C-move reaching t00 onMn, then duplicator moves to z00 onNn.
– If spoiler does a C-move reaching t0i(i6=0)
4, then duplicator moves to zi on Nn. Since (Mn, t0i) ∼=
(Nn, zi), there is a winning strategy after this move.
• The current state is (zi, ti) and i 6= 0: this means before the game gets to this state, both players have only
doneK-moves. In the current state, there have been at most (n − 1) rounds. Thus, i ≤ (n− 1) and players
can do next round as follows:
– If spoiler does a K-move reaching zi0 or zi1, then duplicator does a K-move to reach ti0 where
Mn, ti0 |= p since |i0| = |i1| = (i+ 1) ≤ n and there are Nn, zi0 |= p andNn, zi1 |= p.
– If spoiler does aK-move or a C-move reaching ti0 or ti1, then duplicator does aK-move or a C-move
to reach zi0 where Mn, zi0 |= p since |i0| = |i1| = (i + 1) ≤ n and there are Nn, ti0 |= p and
Nn, ti1 |= p.
– If spoiler does a C-move reaching zj(|j|>|i|), then duplicator does a C-move to reach t0j . Since
(Mn, t0j) ∼= (Nn, zj), there is a winning strategy after this move.
– If spoiler does a C-move reaching t0i(i6=0), duplicator moves to zi on Nn. Since (Mn, t0i) ∼= (Nn, zi),
there is a winning strategy after this move.
Therefore, for arbitrary n ∈ N, there is a winning strategy for duplicator in the n-round CL-game over (Mn, r) and
(Nn, r).
For an arbitrary PLKC-formula ϕ, ϕ has finite modal depth n. By Lemma 4, ϕ is satisfied both on (Mn, r) and
(Nn, r), which means ϕ cannot distinguish (Mn, r) and (Nn, r). This implies that we can never find a PLKC-formula
ϕ to distinguish the class of modelsM and N . But we can find a PLKwCw5-formula KwiCw
5p to distinguish them
since for every (Mn, r) ∈M ,Mn, r |= KwiCw5p and for every (Nn, r) ∈ N , Nn, r |= ¬KwiCw5p.
Therefore, following Theorem 5 can be proved.
Theorem 5 Over K, PLKwCw5 is not expressivity weaker than PLKC.
4The notation t0i is correct since the index for every node in Tn begins with 0.
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This will follow that over K, PLKwCw5 and PLKC are incomparable in expressivity. This is because PLKC is
also not expressively weaker than PLKwCw5. To see this, consider two modelsM1 andM2, where inM1, s1 can
only see a p-world, and in M2, s2 can only see a ¬p-world. It is straightforward to check that M1, s1  Kp but
M2, s2 2 Kp, thus PLKC can distinguish between these pointed models. However, one can show that these two
pointed models cannot be distinguished by PLKwCw5-formulas.
6 PLKwCw5 over Binary Trees
Because of the invalidity of the formula (Cw5ϕ∧Cw5ψ)→ Cw5(ϕ∧ψ), the operatorCw5 is not normal, in the sense
that it cannot be defined with some closures of accessibility relations standardly. However, an interesting observation
over binary-tree models can be proved.
Definition 19 (M, r) is a binary-tree model with root r if (M, r) is a tree model with root r and for any node t inM ,
t has precisely two successors.
Theorem 6 Consider the single-agent case. IfM, r |= Cw5ϕ where (M, r) is a binary tree with root r, then on every
layer of (M, r), the number of the nodes where ϕ is satisfied is even.
In order to prove Theorem 6, we need to prove a stronger theorem:
Theorem 7 For an arbitrary formula ϕ, if M is a binary-tree model, thenM, vm |= Kwni ϕ (1 ≤ n) iff the number
of the ϕ-satisfied nodes on the (|m|+ n)th layer that vm can reach via relation։ is even.
Proof 33 Given a binary tree (M, v0), where v0 is the root, we firstly define the index of M as follows: if there are
nodes vm, t, r inM and vm →i t, vm →i r, then define the index of t as vm0 and the index of r as vm1.
Let vm be an arbitrary node inM . Do induction on n:
• When n = 1,
– Assume M, vm |= Kwiϕ. SinceM is a binary tree, there must be two nodes, vm0 and vm1 such that
vm →i vm0 and vm →i vm1. Since M, vm |= Kw
n
i ϕ, we have (M, vm0 |= ϕ and M, vm1 |= ϕ) or
(M, vm0 |= ¬ϕ or M, vm1 |= ¬ϕ). Thus, on the (|m| + 1)th layer, the number of nodes where ϕ is
satisfied is 2 or 0, both of which are even.
– Assume the number of the nodes on the (|m| + 1)th layer that vm can reach is even. That means there
are only two possible cases: (M, vm0 |= ϕ and M, vm1 |= ϕ) or (M, vm0 |= ¬ϕ or M, vm1 |= ¬ϕ).
Thus, we haveM, vm |= Kwiϕ.
• Induction hypothesis: when n = k,M, vm |= Kwki ϕ(1 ≤ n)⇔ the number of the ϕ-satisfied nodes on the
(|m|+ k)th layer that vm can reach via relation։ is even.
• When n = k + 1,
– AssumeM, vm |= Kw
k+1
i ϕ, which is equivalent toM, vm |= Kw
k
iKwiϕ.
Let T be the set of nodes exactly consisting of all Kwiϕ-satisfied nodes on the (|m| + k)th layer that
vm can reach via relation։. By induction hypothesis, |T | is even. let |T | = 2a. Thus, among all the
successors of T , the number of ϕ-satisfied nodes is 2x + 0y, where x + y = 2a. 2x + 0y is surely an
even number. Let S be a set of nodes only consisting of ¬Kwiϕ-satisfied nodes on the (|m|+ k)th layer
that vm can reach via relation։. SinceM is a binary tree, let |S| = 2b. For every node in S has only
one ϕ-satisfied successor, among all the successors of S, the number of ϕ-satisfied nodes is 2b. Thus,
the number of ϕ-satisfied nodes on the (|m|+ k+1)th layer is 2x+2b = 2(x+ b) which must be even.
– Assume M, vm 6|= Kw
k+1
i ϕ, which means M, vm0 |= Kw
k
i ϕ and M, vm1 |= ¬Kw
k
i ϕ. By induction
hypothesis, the number of the ϕ-satisfied nodes on the (|m| + k + 1)th layer that vm0 can reach via
relation։ is even. And the number of the ϕ-satisfied nodes on the (|m| + k + 1)th layer that vm1 can
reach via relation։ is odd. That means that the ϕ-satisfied nodes on the (|m|+ k+1)th layer that vm
can reach via relation։ is an even number plus an odd number, which equals to an odd number.
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Remark 1 Theorem 6 can be extended into a more general conclusion considering the multi-agent case: on any G-
binary-tree model5 (M, r) where r is the root,M, r |= Cw5ϕ iff for any sequence of agents s in G, on every layer of
the subtree (of (M, r)) generated with s6, the number of the ϕ-satisfied nodes is even.
7 Conclusion and Future work
This is a preliminary report on ‘commonly knowing whether’. We gave five possible definitions for the notion, which
are based on different intuitions. We investigated the implication relations among these definitions in depth, in both
the single-agent and multi-agent cases. We proposed a sound and complete axiomatization for Cw1. Last but not least,
we explored the relative expressivity of Cw5 via a strategy of modal comparison games.
There are a lot of future work to be done; for instance, the axiomatizations of Cw1 over K and over the class of
other various frame classes, the axiomatizations and relative expressivity of other definitions for ‘commonly knowing
whether’.
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